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arXiv:1803.03422cs.CR

MOSQUITO: Covert Ultrasonic Transmissions between Two Air-Gapped Computers using Speaker-to-Speaker Communication

Mordechai Guri, Yosef Solewicz, Andrey Daidakulov, Yuval Elovici

Abstract

In this paper we show how two (or more) airgapped computers in the same room, equipped with passive speakers, headphones, or earphones can covertly exchange data via ultrasonic waves. Microphones are not required. Our method is based on the capability of a malware to exploit a specific audio chip feature in order to reverse the connected speakers from output devices into input devices - unobtrusively rendering them microphones. We discuss the attack model and provide technical background and implementation details. We show that although the reversed speakers/headphones/earphones were not originally designed to perform as microphones, they still respond well to the near-ultrasonic range (18kHz to 24kHz). We evaluate the communication channel with different equipment, and at various distances and transmission speeds, and also discuss some practical considerations. Our results show that the speaker-to-speaker communication can be used to covertly transmit data between two air-gapped computers positioned a maximum of nine meters away from one another. Moreover, we show that two (microphone-less) headphones can exchange data from a distance of three meters apart. This enables 'headphones-to-headphones' covert communication, which is discussed for the first time in this paper.

arXiv comments
Journal reference
DOI
Subjects
cs.CRCryptography and Security

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Linked by 3 identifiable commenters in 3 comments across 3 threads, from Jul 2019 to Jul 2025.

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Discussed in comments3 threads

    • Not unheard of, there was a paper about doing keylogging through the tiny EM fluctuations from a computer's power supply for example: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10197022 Or data exfiltration through fan noise (60 bits/min)…

      Cthulhu_View on HNParent context

    • Here's my basic position: 1. The risk and threats are published 2. The audits I've seen don't evaluate the threats 3. Link me to the audits if you want to convince me I. The risks - airgapping is not enough 1. If the software has zeroday beacons in it, it can communicate with…

      GrothendankView on HNParent context

    • I wonder if there could be a mashup between IMD and BadBIOS/ultrasonic communication https://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.03422.pdf

      phy6View on HNParent context

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