MOSQUITO: Covert Ultrasonic Transmissions between Two Air-Gapped Computers using Speaker-to-Speaker Communication · HackerPapers discussions

MOSQUITO: Covert Ultrasonic Transmissions between Two Air-Gapped Computers using Speaker-to-Speaker Communication — mentioned by Cthulhu_

Tue, 22 Jul 2025 12:53:55 GMT

Not unheard of, there was a paper about doing keylogging through the tiny EM fluctuations from a computer's power supply for example: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10197022 Or data exfiltration through fan noise (60 bits/min): https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S01674... Or data transfer between computers using only speakers: https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.03422 The list goes on.

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

MOSQUITO: Covert Ultrasonic Transmissions between Two Air-Gapped Computers using Speaker-to-Speaker Communication — mentioned by Grothendank

Tue, 04 Apr 2023 23:39:36 GMT

Here's my basic position: 1. The risk and threats are published 2. The audits I've seen don't evaluate the threats 3. Link me to the audits if you want to convince me I. The risks - airgapping is not enough 1. If the software has zeroday beacons in it, it can communicate with zeroday beacon repeaters embedded in VM, OS, or hardware (see: cache side channels: https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3133956.3136064 ) 2. The beacons wouldn't have to look like exploit code, they could just be timing bugs sprinkled into the codebase at random. There are plenty of random little warnings and defects in…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

MOSQUITO: Covert Ultrasonic Transmissions between Two Air-Gapped Computers using Speaker-to-Speaker Communication — mentioned by phy6

Tue, 23 Jul 2019 19:45:07 GMT

I wonder if there could be a mashup between IMD and BadBIOS/ultrasonic communication https://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.03422.pdf

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.