arXiv:quant-ph/0604079quant-ph
The Free Will Theorem
Abstract
On the basis of three physical axioms, we prove that if the choice of a particular type of spin 1 experiment is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters, then its outcome is equally not a function of the information accessible to the particles. We show that this result is robust, and deduce that neither hidden variable theories nor mechanisms of the GRW type for wave function collapse can be made relativistic. We also establish the consistency of our axioms and discuss the philosophical implications.
I like the essence of Quantum Strangeness here: "To be more precise, what we shall show is that the particles’ response∗ to a certain type of experiment is not determined by the entire previous history of that part of the universe accessible to them." John Conway, Simon Kochen…
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