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arXiv:2603.28846quant-ph

Securing Elliptic Curve Cryptocurrencies against Quantum Vulnerabilities: Resource Estimates and Mitigations

Ryan Babbush, Adam Zalcman, Craig Gidney, Michael Broughton, Tanuj Khattar, Hartmut Neven, Thiago Bergamaschi, Justin Drake, Dan Boneh

Abstract

This whitepaper seeks to elucidate implications that the capabilities of developing quantum architectures have on blockchain vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies. First, we provide new resource estimates for breaking the 256-bit Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem, the core of modern blockchain cryptography. We demonstrate that Shor's algorithm for this problem can execute with either <1200 logical qubits and <90 million Toffoli gates or <1450 logical qubits and <70 million Toffoli gates. In the interest of responsible disclosure, we use a zero-knowledge proof to validate these results without disclosing attack vectors. On superconducting architectures with 1e-3 physical error rates and planar connectivity, those circuits can execute in minutes using fewer than half a million physical qubits. We introduce a critical distinction between fast-clock (such as superconducting and photonic) and slow-clock (such as neutral atom and ion trap) architectures. Our analysis reveals that the first fast-clock CRQCs would enable on-spend attacks on public mempool transactions of some cryptocurrencies. We survey major cryptocurrency vulnerabilities through this lens, identifying systemic risks associated with advanced features in some blockchains such as smart contracts, Proof-of-Stake consensus, and Data Availability Sampling, as well as the enduring concern of abandoned assets. We argue that technical solutions would benefit from accompanying public policy and discuss various frameworks of digital salvage to regulate the recovery or destruction of dormant assets while preventing adversarial seizure. We also discuss implications for other digital assets and tokenization as well as challenges and successful examples of the ongoing transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Finally, we urge all vulnerable cryptocurrency communities to join the ongoing migration to PQC without delay.

arXiv comments
57 pages, 14 figures. v2 patches software bug enabling exploit against ZKP soundness
Journal reference
DOI
Subjects
quant-phQuantum Physics cs.CRCryptography and Security

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Linked by 3 identifiable commenters in 3 comments across 3 threads, from Apr 2026 to Apr 2026. Found in 1 HN submission from Apr 2026 to Apr 2026. Open submission discussions.

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Discussed in comments3 threads

    • This will probably not help enough for asymmetric keys, and is unnecessary for symmetric keys. https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.28846 claims an attack runtime of a few minutes. There are enough order-of-magnitude breakthroughs between today and scalable quantum error correction, that…

      FiloSottileView on HNParent context

  1. [dead] 1 comment
    • Full paper: arXiv:2603.28846. Two circuits for ECDLP-256 — one at <1,200 logical qubits / 90M Toffoli gates, one at <1,450 / 70M. ~20x reduction in physical qubit requirements over prior estimates. Notably, Google withheld the actual circuits and instead published a ZK proof…

      DARSHANFOFADIYAView on HNParent context

    • The newest transaction mechanism (taproot; P2TR) exposes the public key of the receiver as part of the transaction. If it becomes more commonly used, the supply of bitcoins with exposed public keys would start going up again. See figure 5 of…

      StrilancView on HNParent context

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