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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Securing Elliptic Curve Cryptocurrencies against Quantum Vulnerabilities: Resource Estimates and Mitigations · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2603.28846/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2603.28846/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Securing Elliptic Curve Cryptocurrencies against Quantum Vulnerabilities: Resource Estimates and Mitigations — mentioned by FiloSottile</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47841911</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:2603.28846:47841911</guid><pubDate>Mon, 20 Apr 2026 22:31:29 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;This will probably not help enough for asymmetric keys, and is unnecessary for symmetric keys. https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.28846 claims an attack runtime of a few minutes. There are enough order-of-magnitude breakthroughs between today and scalable quantum error correction, that it makes no sense to try to to guess exactly the order of magnitude of the attacks that will be feasible. Either you believe they won&amp;#x27;t happen, in which case you can keep using long-term ECDSA keys, or you believe they will happen, in which case they are likely to overshoot your rotation period.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2603.28846/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>quant-ph</category></item><item><title>Securing Elliptic Curve Cryptocurrencies against Quantum Vulnerabilities: Resource Estimates and Mitigations — mentioned by DARSHANFOFADIYA</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47736636</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:2603.28846:47736636</guid><pubDate>Sun, 12 Apr 2026 06:14:41 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;Full paper: arXiv:2603.28846. Two circuits for ECDLP-256 — one at &amp;lt;1,200 logical qubits / 90M Toffoli gates, one at &amp;lt;1,450 / 70M. ~20x reduction in physical qubit requirements over prior estimates. Notably, Google withheld the actual circuits and instead published a ZK proof (SP1 zkVM + Groth16 SNARK) verifying correctness without exposing the implementation. They also pre-coordinated with the U.S. government before release. I wrote a first-principles derivation tracing the full chain from elliptic curve point addition to the 90M gate count…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2603.28846/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>quant-ph</category></item><item><title>Securing Elliptic Curve Cryptocurrencies against Quantum Vulnerabilities: Resource Estimates and Mitigations — HN submission</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47728292</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:submission:2603.28846:47728292</guid><pubDate>Sat, 11 Apr 2026 07:16:10 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;Securing ECC Cryptocurrencies Against Quantum Vulnerabilities&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;2 points; 1 discussion reply on HN. &lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2603.28846/"&gt;Paper and source history&lt;/a&gt;. A submission is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>quant-ph</category></item><item><title>Securing Elliptic Curve Cryptocurrencies against Quantum Vulnerabilities: Resource Estimates and Mitigations — mentioned by Strilanc</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47617839</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:2603.28846:47617839</guid><pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2026 17:56:31 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;The newest transaction mechanism (taproot; P2TR) exposes the public key of the receiver as part of the transaction. If it becomes more commonly used, the supply of bitcoins with exposed public keys would start going up again. See figure 5 of https://arxiv.org/pdf/2603.28846#page=14 .&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2603.28846/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>quant-ph</category></item></channel></rss>
