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arXiv:2506.06941cs.AI

The Illusion of Thinking: Understanding the Strengths and Limitations of Reasoning Models via the Lens of Problem Complexity

Parshin Shojaee, Iman Mirzadeh, Keivan Alizadeh, Maxwell Horton, Samy Bengio, Mehrdad Farajtabar

Abstract

Recent generations of language models have introduced Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) that generate detailed thinking processes before providing answers. While these models demonstrate improved performance on reasoning benchmarks, their fundamental capabilities, scaling properties, and limitations remain insufficiently understood. Current evaluations primarily focus on established math and coding benchmarks, emphasizing final answer accuracy. However, this evaluation paradigm often suffers from contamination and does not provide insights into the reasoning traces. In this work, we systematically investigate these gaps with the help of controllable puzzle environments that allow precise manipulation of complexity while maintaining consistent logical structures. This setup enables the analysis of not only final answers but also the internal reasoning traces, offering insights into how LRMs think. Through extensive experiments, we show that LRMs face a complete accuracy collapse beyond certain complexities. Moreover, they exhibit a counterintuitive scaling limit: their reasoning effort increases with problem complexity up to a point, then declines despite having remaining token budget. By comparing LRMs with their standard LLM counterparts under same inference compute, we identify three performance regimes: (1) low-complexity tasks where standard models outperform LRMs, (2) medium-complexity tasks where LRMs demonstrates advantage, and (3) high-complexity tasks where both models face complete collapse. We found that LRMs have limitations in exact computation: they fail to use explicit algorithms and reason inconsistently across scales. We also investigate the reasoning traces in more depth, studying the patterns of explored solutions and analyzing the models' computational behavior, shedding light on their strengths, limitations, and raising questions about their reasoning capabilities.

arXiv comments
NeurIPS 2025. camera-ready version + additional discussion in the appendix
Journal reference
DOI
Subjects
cs.AIArtificial Intelligence cs.CLComputation and Language cs.LGMachine Learning

On Hacker News

Linked by 4 identifiable commenters in 4 comments across 4 threads, from Jun 2025 to Sep 2026. Found in 1 HN submission from Oct 2026 to Oct 2026. Open submission discussions.

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Discussed in comments4 threads

    • AI models and in particular LLMs are not capable of logic reasoning. See for example this paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.06941 Ergo, they can't prove any theorem whatsoever. How do people at OpenAI expect that we believe in claims like that? This is yet another before-the-IPO…

      jeanmichelselliView on HNParent context

    • The article is heavily leaning on the paper "The Illusion of Thinking" [1]. It could be boiled down to: in 2025 this paper showed that "thought traces" in the models of the time could sometimes be inaccurate or misleading. Today they still might be, although OpenAI says actually…

      montebicycleloView on HNParent context

    • Structured thinking and deliberation are indeed important, but you can also make LLMs do structured "thinking" if you work hard enough, and generate quite plausible reasoned arguments with valid real-world results, and you can get them to write down their working as they go. But…

      lambdaoneView on HNParent context

  1. The Rise of Reasoning Machines 1 comment
    • Nathan Lambert provides a counterpoint to the recent "The Illusion of Thinking" paper by Apple [1]: "On one of these toy problems, the Tower of Hanoi, the models structurally cannot output enough tokens to solve the problem — the authors still took this as a claim that “these…

      curious_cat_163View on HNParent context

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