arXiv:1909.05747cs.CR
Protecting the stack with PACed canaries
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Abstract
Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure and brute-forcing attacks. We propose PCan, a new approach based on ARMv8.3-A pointer authentication (PA), that uses dynamically-generated canaries to mitigate these weaknesses and show that it provides more fine-grained protection with minimal performance overhead.
> JIT is normalizing creating new executable code at run-time shrug the alternative is to be iOS, where programming languages are banned. The simple and now widespread mitigation is "W xor X": enforcing that pages must either be data or code, but if something is supposed to be…
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