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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Protecting the stack with PACed canaries · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1909.05747/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1909.05747/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Protecting the stack with PACed canaries — mentioned by pjc50</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25057574</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1909.05747:25057574</guid><pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2020 11:50:07 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; JIT is normalizing creating new executable code at run-time shrug the alternative is to be iOS, where programming languages are banned. The simple and now widespread mitigation is &amp;quot;W xor X&amp;quot;: enforcing that pages must either be data or code, but if something is supposed to be executable it must not be writable. So JITs must build their code and then call the operating system to change the page into executable. But even this isn&amp;#x27;t entirely sufficient in situations where &amp;quot;ROP&amp;quot; (return oriented programming) is possible; this relies on finding &amp;quot;gadgets&amp;quot; at the tail end of functions that contain…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1909.05747/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item></channel></rss>
