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arXiv:1706.06752quant-ph

Quantum resource estimates for computing elliptic curve discrete logarithms

Martin Roetteler, Michael Naehrig, Krysta M. Svore, Kristin Lauter

Abstract

We give precise quantum resource estimates for Shor's algorithm to compute discrete logarithms on elliptic curves over prime fields. The estimates are derived from a simulation of a Toffoli gate network for controlled elliptic curve point addition, implemented within the framework of the quantum computing software tool suite LIQ$Ui|\rangle$. We determine circuit implementations for reversible modular arithmetic, including modular addition, multiplication and inversion, as well as reversible elliptic curve point addition. We conclude that elliptic curve discrete logarithms on an elliptic curve defined over an $n$-bit prime field can be computed on a quantum computer with at most $9n + 2\lceil\log_2(n)\rceil+10$ qubits using a quantum circuit of at most $448 n^3 \log_2(n) + 4090 n^3$ Toffoli gates. We are able to classically simulate the Toffoli networks corresponding to the controlled elliptic curve point addition as the core piece of Shor's algorithm for the NIST standard curves P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521. Our approach allows gate-level comparisons to recent resource estimates for Shor's factoring algorithm. The results also support estimates given earlier by Proos and Zalka and indicate that, for current parameters at comparable classical security levels, the number of qubits required to tackle elliptic curves is less than for attacking RSA, suggesting that indeed ECC is an easier target than RSA.

arXiv comments
24 pages, 2 tables, 11 figures. v2: typos fixed and reference added. ASIACRYPT 2017
Journal reference
DOI
Subjects
quant-phQuantum Physics cs.ETEmerging Technologies

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Discussed in comments3 threads

    • > ECC algorithms with smaller key sizes would be more vulnerable to a quantum attack, as it would require a currently theoretical quantum computer with fewer qubits than would be required for an RSA key with the same cryptographic strength [25]. This is what keeps me skeptical…

      bob1029View on HNParent context

    • Elliptic curve cryptography can be broken by Shor's algorithm as well https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.06752

      kamovView on HNParent context

    • Even if the number of qubits doubled every year from here on out, it would be 15+ years until we had enough working space to run Shor's algorithm on modern cryptographic key sizes. Back of the envelope: - It takes 9n error-corrected qubits to break an n-bit ECDH key [1] - Each…

      StrilancView on HNParent context

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