Quantum resource estimates for computing elliptic curve discrete logarithms · HackerPapers discussions

Quantum resource estimates for computing elliptic curve discrete logarithms — mentioned by bob1029

Tue, 24 Mar 2026 15:14:04 GMT

> ECC algorithms with smaller key sizes would be more vulnerable to a quantum attack, as it would require a currently theoretical quantum computer with fewer qubits than would be required for an RSA key with the same cryptographic strength [25]. This is what keeps me skeptical about ECC. RSA is really chunky, and maybe that's a fundamental advantage from an information theory perspective. Compromising on the crypto scheme because we can't fit inside UDP seems like a cursed path. [25]: https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.06752

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Quantum resource estimates for computing elliptic curve discrete logarithms — mentioned by kamov

Thu, 01 Aug 2024 08:58:17 GMT

Elliptic curve cryptography can be broken by Shor's algorithm as well https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.06752

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Quantum resource estimates for computing elliptic curve discrete logarithms — mentioned by Strilanc

Fri, 29 Jun 2018 17:29:59 GMT

Even if the number of qubits doubled every year from here on out, it would be 15+ years until we had enough working space to run Shor's algorithm on modern cryptographic key sizes. Back of the envelope: - It takes 9n error-corrected qubits to break an n-bit ECDH key [1] - Each error-corrected qubit requires ~2500 physical qubits [2][3] - Typical ECDH key size is 256 bits [4] - This year would be the year of ~64 physical qubit machines. [5][6][7] - log_2(256 * 9 * 2500 / 64) ~= 16.4 years Note that every one of the quantities in the estimate is subject to future research. E.g. the error…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.