arXiv:1608.06580cs.GT
Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria
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Abstract
For a constant $ε$, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of $ε$-Nash equilibrium in two-player NxN games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of $(ε,ε)$-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least $(1-ε)$-fraction of the players are $ε$-best replying.
Yeah, even with unbounded computational power, Nash equilibria are communication-hard; i.e., you need exponentially many bits for an n-player game to converge to an equilibrium, even when all players have unbounded computational power. See https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.06580.pdf.
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