Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria · HackerPapers discussions

Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria — mentioned by LolWolf

Wed, 21 Oct 2020 16:48:59 GMT

Yeah, even with unbounded computational power, Nash equilibria are communication-hard; i.e., you need exponentially many bits for an n-player game to converge to an equilibrium, even when all players have unbounded computational power. See https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.06580.pdf.

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Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria — mentioned by LolWolf

Mon, 06 Apr 2020 19:48:36 GMT

Upvoted due to the interesting story, but the point is conceptually unclear (at least to me, but I'm quite slow) how would this improve my cognitive toolkit? I understand the (one) example presented apart from wrestling, but it is not quite obvious that the actual framework of Kayfabe immediately maps to it. It feels like there are easier constructions that would explain this exactly as well, if not better (perhaps most notably, the Prisoner's dilemma and the fact that coordination games are hard[0]). --- [0] https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.06580

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Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria — HN submission

Thu, 19 Oct 2017 03:37:35 GMT

Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

1 point; 0 discussion replies on HN. Paper and source history. A submission is not an endorsement.

Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria — mentioned by LolWolf

Thu, 19 Oct 2017 03:37:08 GMT

I've seen this paper enough to warrant a comment. The paper makes no reduction that the market is computing in P, so it's unclear to me how this conclusion of P=NP iff EMH is warranted by the paper. Perhaps more clearly showing the connection between 'complexity' in the general sense and EMH is this paper[0], showing that even (eps, eps)-weak (or approximate) Nash equilibria are communication-hard (exponential in the number of players), would be the first that has convinced me that markets are highly unlikely to be efficient. --- [0] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.06580.pdf

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria — HN submission

Fri, 11 Aug 2017 19:48:46 GMT

Communication complexity of approximate Nash equlibria

2 points; 0 discussion replies on HN. Paper and source history. A submission is not an endorsement.