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arXiv:1412.4707cs.CR

Fair anonymity for the Tor network

Jesus Diaz, David Arroyo, Francisco B. Rodriguez

Early discovery. Linked by one identifiable commenter. This paper is outside the main ranking; a mention is not an endorsement.

Abstract

Current anonymizing networks have become an important tool for guaranteeing users' privacy. However, these platforms can be used to perform illegitimate actions, which sometimes makes service providers see traffic coming from these networks as a probable threat. In order to solve this problem, we propose to add support for fairness mechanisms to the Tor network. Specifically, by introducing a slight modification to the key negotiation process with the entry and exit nodes, in the shape of group signatures. By means of these signatures, we set up an access control method to prevent misbehaving users to make use of the Tor network. Additionally, we establish a predefined method for denouncing illegitimate actions, which impedes the application of the proposed fairness mechanisms as a threat eroding users' privacy. As a direct consequence, traffic coming from Tor would be considered less suspicious by service providers.

arXiv comments
Journal reference
DOI
Subjects
cs.CRCryptography and Security

On Hacker News

Linked by 1 identifiable commenter in 7 comments across 7 threads, from Feb 2015 to Mar 2016.

Comments linking this paper, per year.

Discussed in comments7 threads

  1. The Trouble with Tor 1 comment
    • I'm glad to see CloudFlare addressing Tor users and issues with CAPTCHA, as I've been victim of this myself multiple times in recent years. In particular is the issue that CloudFlare assumes javascript-enabled browsers, a condition which may well not be met. I recorded an…

      dredmorbiusView on HNParent context

    • Most spam isn't encrypted. The overhead's too high. Behavioral methods might still work, particularly whitelisting/greylisting. Whitelisted senders will be passed, greylisted ones filtered. Spam can still be filtered locally with a key, if necessary, though that misses the…

      dredmorbiusView on HNParent context

    • One thing I suspect widespread use of onion routing will need are compatible anonymous reputation systems. I'd really like to see work in this area. I'm aware of two proposed systems, both largely academic: FAUST and Fair Anonymity: https://gnunet.org/node/1704…

      dredmorbiusView on HNParent context

    • Is Google's Eric Grosse familiar with anonymous authentication techniques over Tor? Because there are at least two projects which address this: FAUST and Fair Anonymity: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.4707v1.pdf https://gnunet.org/node/1704 I very strongly encourage Eric to have his…

      dredmorbiusView on HNParent context

    • My biggest single problem using Tor is that far too many sites either block exit nodes outright or subject them to (frankly, understandable) increased levels of scruitany. I use and run a Tor proxy (_not_ an exit node, mind), but notably Craigslist tends to block pretty much…

      dredmorbiusView on HNParent context

    • An issue that I've run into is that 1) Google registers traffic from Tor proxies as suspicious (with some reason), it 2) puts Captchas in front of you (which are getting quite difficult to solve), and 3) if you're rate-limiting Tor proxies (around 6,000 - 7,000 worldwide as I…

      dredmorbiusView on HNParent context

    • A few quick observations: ⚫ Having all your eggs in one basket is a poor option. And by "your" I mean "my". ⚫ IP-based reputation tracking's been useful. It's dead. Get over it. Thank the NSA. And Google. And Verizon. And advertisers. Not necessarily in that order. ⚫ If you're…

      dredmorbiusView on HNParent context

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