Fair anonymity for the Tor network · HackerPapers discussions

Fair anonymity for the Tor network — mentioned by dredmorbius

Thu, 31 Mar 2016 03:04:54 GMT

I'm glad to see CloudFlare addressing Tor users and issues with CAPTCHA, as I've been victim of this myself multiple times in recent years. In particular is the issue that CloudFlare assumes javascript-enabled browsers, a condition which may well not be met. I recorded an exchange with CloudFlare support some time back in which the CloudFlare rep was apparently unaware how or why this might occur: https://plus.google.com/104092656004159577193/posts/H2sakaRx... I'm also aware of some tools/approaches which address the question of fair anonymity -- ensuring well-behaved clients while retaining…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Fair anonymity for the Tor network — mentioned by dredmorbius

Wed, 16 Sep 2015 23:35:50 GMT

Most spam isn't encrypted. The overhead's too high. Behavioral methods might still work, particularly whitelisting/greylisting. Whitelisted senders will be passed, greylisted ones filtered. Spam can still be filtered locally with a key, if necessary, though that misses the leverage of delivery-time notification. A notify-and-fetch dynamic might also work. Rather than delivering messages at send time, a notification that there is a message is sent, an on its strength, the message is later requested. Spammers have a much larger mail storage problem. Whitelisted senders might have mail delivered…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Fair anonymity for the Tor network — mentioned by dredmorbius

Thu, 23 Jul 2015 02:14:51 GMT

One thing I suspect widespread use of onion routing will need are compatible anonymous reputation systems. I'd really like to see work in this area. I'm aware of two proposed systems, both largely academic: FAUST and Fair Anonymity: https://gnunet.org/node/1704 http://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.4707v1.pdf One idea is that older (and still trustworthy) tokens become reliable and more valuable, encouraging parties to 1) keep their tokens for a long time and 2) behave themselves. As I recall, both operate with the concept of a token server. In the case of FAUST, tokens are requested unblinded (that is…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Fair anonymity for the Tor network — mentioned by dredmorbius

Tue, 12 May 2015 06:14:14 GMT

Is Google's Eric Grosse familiar with anonymous authentication techniques over Tor? Because there are at least two projects which address this: FAUST and Fair Anonymity: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.4707v1.pdf https://gnunet.org/node/1704 I very strongly encourage Eric to have his team look at these, or other options, and back the motherluving frell out of whatever seems viable. Listening to his Re:publica conversation with EFF's Jillian York, the topic comes up, but best I can tell he doesn't know of these. At 17m 50s in the presentation, the question of using Google services over Tor is…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Fair anonymity for the Tor network — mentioned by dredmorbius

Sun, 26 Apr 2015 14:24:19 GMT

My biggest single problem using Tor is that far too many sites either block exit nodes outright or subject them to (frankly, understandable) increased levels of scruitany. I use and run a Tor proxy (_not_ an exit node, mind), but notably Craigslist tends to block pretty much _all_ Tor traffic, and sites employing Cloudflare's DDoS protection present a Javascript-only CAPTCHA. Given that one of my primary Tor browsers is a console-only browser without JS support, that does little for me. Google despite other problems (below) actually Does The Right Thing and presents an image which I can fetch…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Fair anonymity for the Tor network — mentioned by dredmorbius

Tue, 24 Feb 2015 13:55:30 GMT

An issue that I've run into is that 1) Google registers traffic from Tor proxies as suspicious (with some reason), it 2) puts Captchas in front of you (which are getting quite difficult to solve), and 3) if you're rate-limiting Tor proxies (around 6,000 - 7,000 worldwide as I was checking earlier), you're going to block a lot of legitimate Tor traffic. Similarly for VPNs and other tools. Whose use is fairly likely to increase as people start seeking ways to avoid ubiquitous surveillance. There are other options, including a few tools that look at how to provide a fair and anonymous reputation…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Fair anonymity for the Tor network — mentioned by dredmorbius

Tue, 17 Feb 2015 08:41:31 GMT

A few quick observations: ⚫ Having all your eggs in one basket is a poor option. And by "your" I mean "my". ⚫ IP-based reputation tracking's been useful. It's dead. Get over it. Thank the NSA. And Google. And Verizon. And advertisers. Not necessarily in that order. ⚫ If you're not offering me GPG/PGP based multi-factor authentication, fuck you. Seriously. Just fuck you. ⚫ Have your CEO go through your account recovery process. Try not to piss them off or hand the keys to their castle to the wrong party. Like I'm supposed to remember the month and year I signed up for your service? Not.…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.