<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Quantum Computers, Factoring, and Decoherence · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/quant-ph_9503007/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/quant-ph_9503007/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Quantum Computers, Factoring, and Decoherence — mentioned by apawloski</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4932628</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:quant-ph_9503007:4932628</guid><pubDate>Mon, 17 Dec 2012 15:32:39 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;To clarify a bit further, only a few cryptosystems (certain public key systems) are really threatened by quantum computers. Theoretically, literature indicates that quantum computers are really good at factoring large numbers [1], and they are really good at solving discrete log problems [2]. So yes, QCs are theoretically able to crack in linear time some systems whose security depends on those problems being hard (eg ElGamal, RSA). But systems that don&amp;#x27;t rely on large primes/discrete logs (eg symmetric algorithms like AES) are not vulnerable to quantum computers. (At least not vulnerable in…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/quant-ph_9503007/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>quant-ph</category></item></channel></rss>
