SatBleed: Security of Commoditized Communication Modules in Satellites

Abstract

Substantial reduction in launch and manufacturing costs has resulted in the accelerated deployment of small satellite missions, with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components becoming the prevailing standard for specific subsystems. However, this modular architecture introduces critical security risks, most notably in the Communication Subsystem (COM), which is continuously exposed by design and implicitly trusted as the entry point for command and control. We construct a tailored threat taxonomy for attacks targeting the COM subsystem and analyze representative COM systems from various vendors. Our findings uncover severe vulnerabilities across firmware, protocols, and architectural designs. This work presents the first in-depth security evaluation of widely deployed COTS COM modules employed in small satellites, identifying vulnerabilities affecting dozens of missions. To assess the real-world impact, we correlate our discoveries with open-source telemetry data, inferring at least 28 vulnerable missions in orbit that are susceptible to hostile takeover. Our work reveals that satellite COM subsystems form an attractive and dangerously neglected attack surface, necessitating urgent attention from the community.