https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2602.11865/Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.enMon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMThttps://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49381380urn:hackerpapers:submission:2602.11865:49381380Thu, 20 Aug 2026 22:54:06 GMT<p>Intelligent AI Delegation</p><p></p><p>2 points; 0 discussion replies on HN. <a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2602.11865/">Paper and source history</a>. A submission is not an endorsement.</p>cs.AIhttps://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47049042urn:hackerpapers:submission:2602.11865:47049042Tue, 17 Feb 2026 16:08:01 GMT<p>Intelligent AI Delegation</p><p></p><p>2 points; 0 discussion replies on HN. <a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2602.11865/">Paper and source history</a>. A submission is not an endorsement.</p>cs.AIhttps://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47043355urn:hackerpapers:mention:2602.11865:47043355Tue, 17 Feb 2026 03:24:23 GMT<p>I built DelegateOS because every agent framework today assumes all agents are trusted. CrewAI, AutoGen, LangGraph, MCP, A2A — none of them answer a basic question: when Agent A delegates to Agent B, what prevents B from accessing things A never intended? The Google DeepMind delegation paper (arxiv.org/abs/2602.11865, Feb 2026) calls this out explicitly. MCP handles tool access, A2A handles agent communication, but nobody handles the trust and accountability layer between them. DelegateOS fills that gap with Ed25519-signed delegation tokens that enforce monotonic attenuation (sub-agents can…</p><p><a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2602.11865/">Paper and discussion history</a>. A mention is not an endorsement.</p>cs.AIhttps://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47037530urn:hackerpapers:submission:2602.11865:47037530Mon, 16 Feb 2026 17:11:15 GMT<p>Intelligent AI Delegation (2026)</p><p></p><p>1 point; 0 discussion replies on HN. <a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2602.11865/">Paper and source history</a>. A submission is not an endorsement.</p>cs.AI