LLMs + Security = Trouble

Abstract

We argue that when it comes to producing secure code with AI, the prevailing "fighting fire with fire" approach -- using probabilistic AI-based checkers or attackers to secure probabilistically generated code -- fails to address the long tail of security bugs. As a result, systems may remain exposed to zero-day vulnerabilities that can be discovered by better-resourced or more persistent adversaries. While neurosymbolic approaches that combine LLMs with formal methods are attractive in principle, we argue that they are difficult to reconcile with the "vibe coding" workflow common in LLM-assisted development: unless the end-to-end verification pipeline is fully automated, developers are repeatedly asked to validate specifications, resolve ambiguities, and adjudicate failures, making the human-in-the-loop a likely point of weakness, compromising secure-by-construction guarantees. In this paper we argue that stronger security guarantees can be obtained by enforcing security constraints during code generation (e.g., via constrained decoding), rather than relying solely on post-hoc detection and repair. This direction is particularly promising for diffusion-style code models, whose approach provides a natural elegant opportunity for modular, hierarchical security enforcement, allowing us to combine lower-latency generation techniques with generating secure-by-construction code.