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arXiv:2602.01790econ.TH

Beyond Hurwicz: Incentive Compatibility under Informational Decentralization

David Lancashire

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Abstract

Achieving incentive compatibility under informational decentralization is impossible within the class of direct and revelation-equivalent mechanisms typically studied in economics and computer science. We show that these impossibility results are conditional by identifying a narrow class of non-revelation-equivalent mechanisms that sustain enforcement by inferring preferences indirectly through parallel, uncorrelatable games.

arXiv comments
39 pages, 5 figures, for one-page summary see https://github.com/SaitoTech/papers/blob/main/hurwicz/summary.pdf
Journal reference
DOI
Subjects
econ.THTheoretical Economics

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