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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>A Systematic Review of Technical Defenses Against Software-Based Cheating in Online Multiplayer Games · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2512.21377/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2512.21377/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>A Systematic Review of Technical Defenses Against Software-Based Cheating in Online Multiplayer Games — mentioned by dijit</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48645429</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:2512.21377:48645429</guid><pubDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2026 14:23:40 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;Attestation-gated anti-cheat is invasive, and the direction it points is grim. But &amp;quot;covers for incompetently designed netcode&amp;quot; doesn&amp;#x27;t hold at all. Netcode and cheat-resistance are mostly orthogonal. Netcode is latency-hiding — prediction, reconciliation, interpolation. Cheating is the client being an endpoint you don&amp;#x27;t control. You can have flawless netcode and still get wallhacked, because a wallhack touches the renderer, not the wire. You have to ship that data for the client to draw the level. Server-side validation kills the cheats that surface as state: speedhacks, teleports, impossible…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2512.21377/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item></channel></rss>
