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arXiv:2510.06525cs.LG

Text-to-Image Models Leave Identifiable Signatures: Implications for Leaderboard Security

Ali Naseh, Anshuman Suri, Yuefeng Peng, Harsh Chaudhari, Alina Oprea, Amir Houmansadr

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Abstract

Generative AI leaderboards are central to evaluating model capabilities, but remain vulnerable to manipulation. Among key adversarial objectives is rank manipulation, where an attacker must first deanonymize the models behind displayed outputs -- a threat previously demonstrated and explored for large language models (LLMs). We show that this problem can be even more severe for text-to-image leaderboards, where deanonymization is markedly easier. Using over 150,000 generated images from 280 prompts and 19 diverse models spanning multiple organizations, architectures, and sizes, we demonstrate that simple real-time classification in CLIP embedding space identifies the generating model with high accuracy, even without prompt control or historical data. We further introduce a prompt-level separability metric and identify prompts that enable near-perfect deanonymization. Our results indicate that rank manipulation in text-to-image leaderboards is easier than previously recognized, underscoring the need for stronger defenses.

arXiv comments
Accepted at Lock-LLM Workshop, NeurIPS 2025
Journal reference
DOI
Subjects
cs.LGMachine Learning cs.CRCryptography and Security

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    • Text-to-Image Models Leave Identifiable Signatures: Implications for Leaderboard Security https://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.06525

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