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arXiv:2506.17336cs.CR

PPMI: Privacy-Preserving LLM Interaction with Socratic Chain-of-Thought Reasoning and Homomorphically Encrypted Vector Databases

Yubeen Bae, Minchan Kim, Jaejin Lee, Sangbum Kim, Jaehyung Kim, Yejin Choi, Niloofar Mireshghallah

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Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as personal agents, accessing sensitive user data such as calendars, emails, and medical records. Users currently face a trade-off: They can send private records, many of which are stored in remote databases, to powerful but untrusted LLM providers, increasing their exposure risk. Alternatively, they can run less powerful models locally on trusted devices. We bridge this gap. Our Socratic Chain-of-Thought Reasoning first sends a generic, non-private user query to a powerful, untrusted LLM, which generates a Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompt and detailed sub-queries without accessing user data. Next, we embed these sub-queries and perform encrypted sub-second semantic search using our Homomorphically Encrypted Vector Database across one million entries of a single user's private data. This represents a realistic scale of personal documents, emails, and records accumulated over years of digital activity. Finally, we feed the CoT prompt and the decrypted records to a local language model and generate the final response. On the LoCoMo long-context QA benchmark, our hybrid framework, combining GPT-4o with a local Llama-3.2-1B model, outperforms using GPT-4o alone by up to 7.1 percentage points. This demonstrates a first step toward systems where tasks are decomposed and split between untrusted strong LLMs and weak local ones, preserving user privacy.

arXiv comments
29 pages
Journal reference
DOI
Subjects
cs.CRCryptography and Security cs.AIArtificial Intelligence

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    • Thanks for the interest. HEVEC uses partial homomorphic encryption, not FHE. It supports only the operations needed for an encrypted vector database (search, insert, delete, etc.), which keeps performance practical. Implementation details are in our paper…

      cloneismeView on HNParent context

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