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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Securing AI Agents with Information-Flow Control · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2505.23643/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2505.23643/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Securing AI Agents with Information-Flow Control — mentioned by spankalee</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45076862</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:2505.23643:45076862</guid><pubDate>Sat, 30 Aug 2025 18:20:13 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;After reading this more closely and following some of the links I think this post is really pointing to something more foundational than the &amp;quot;VM for AI&amp;quot; summary implies. The VM analogy is simply insufficient for securing LLM workflows where you can&amp;#x27;t trust the LLM to do what you told it to with potentially sensitive data. You may have a top-level workflow that needs access to both sensitive operations (network access) and sensitive data (PII, credentials), and an LLM that&amp;#x27;s susceptible to prompt injection attacks and general correctness and alignment problems. You can&amp;#x27;t just run the LLM calls…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2505.23643/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item></channel></rss>
