https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2503.21145/Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.enMon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMThttps://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43532509urn:hackerpapers:mention:2503.21145:43532509Mon, 31 Mar 2025 08:17:45 GMT<p>There isn&#x27;t anything new here to defend against lifetime-related UB. For that it simply references https://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.21145, which is just a summary of existing dynamic mitigations --- which don&#x27;t fix UB at the language level, impose performance tradeoffs, and in the case of pointer integrity, require hardware support that excludes e.g. x86. Look at it this way --- mature products like Chrome are already doing all of that wherever they can. If it was enough, they wouldn&#x27;t worry about C++ UB anymore. But they do.</p><p><a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2503.21145/">Paper and discussion history</a>. A mention is not an endorsement.</p>cs.CRhttps://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43532220urn:hackerpapers:submission:2503.21145:43532220Mon, 31 Mar 2025 07:36:56 GMT<p>How to Secure Existing C and C++ Software Without Memory Safety [pdf]</p><p></p><p>132 points; 86 discussion replies on HN. <a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2503.21145/">Paper and source history</a>. A submission is not an endorsement.</p>cs.CR