arXiv:2503.10566cs.LG
ASIDE: Architectural Separation of Instructions and Data in Language Models
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Abstract
Despite their remarkable performance, large language models lack elementary safety features, making them susceptible to numerous malicious attacks. In particular, previous work has identified the absence of an intrinsic separation between instructions and data as the root cause of the success of prompt injection attacks. In this work, we propose a new architectural element, ASIDE, that allows language models to clearly separate instructions and data at the level of token embeddings. ASIDE applies an orthogonal rotation to the embeddings of data tokens, thus creating clearly distinct representations of instructions and data tokens without introducing any additional parameters. As we demonstrate experimentally across a range of models, instruction-tuning LLMs with ASIDE (1) achieves substantially higher instruction-data separation without performance loss and (2) makes the models more robust to prompt injection benchmarks, even without dedicated safety training. Additionally, we provide insights into the mechanism underlying our method through an analysis of the model representations. The source code and training scripts are openly accessible at https://github.com/egozverev/aside.
if you want to avoid my massive post (sorry), there's a paper here positing how instruction-data separation is likely a major cause of prompt injection specifically. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2403.06833 then another paper where they change the architecture of a model to deal with…
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