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arXiv:2503.02772cs.CR

ESSPI: ECDSA/Schnorr Signed Program Input for BitVMX

Sergio Demian Lerner, Martin Jonas, Ariel Futoransky

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Abstract

The BitVM and BitVMX protocols have long relied on inefficient one-time signature (OTS) schemes like Lamport and Winternitz for signing program inputs. These schemes exhibit significant storage overheads, hindering their practical application. This paper introduces ESSPI, an optimized method leveraging ECDSA/Schnorr signatures to sign the BitVMX program input. With Schnorr signatures we achieve an optimal 1:1 data expansion, compared to the current known best ratio of 1:200 based on Winternitz signatures. To accomplish this we introduce 4 innovations to BitVMX: (1) a modification of the BitVMX CPU, adding a challengeable hashing core to it, (2) a new partition-based search to detect fraud during hashing, (3) a new enhanced transaction DAG with added data-carrying transactions with a fraud-verifying smart-contract and (4) a novel timelock-based method for proving data availability to Bitcoin smart contracts. The enhanced BitVMX protocol enables the verification of uncompressed inputs such as SPV proofs, NiPoPoWs, or longer computation integrity proofs, such as STARKs.

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DOI
Subjects
cs.CRCryptography and Security cs.DCDistributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing

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