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arXiv:2410.16965quant-ph

Downtime Required for Bitcoin Quantum-Safety

Jamie J. Pont, Joseph J. Kearney, Jack Moyler, Carlos A. Perez-Delgado

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Abstract

Quantum devices capable of breaking the public-key cryptosystems that Bitcoin relies on to secure its transactions are expected with reasonable probability within a decade. Quantum attacks would put at risk the entire Bitcoin network, which has an estimated value of around 500 billion USD. To prevent this threat, a proactive approach is critical. The only known way to prevent any such attack is to upgrade the currently used public-key cryptosystems, namely ECDSA, with so-called post-quantum cryptosystems which have no known vulnerabilities to quantum attacks. In this paper, we analyse the technical cost of such an upgrade. We calculate a non-tight lower bound on the cumulative downtime required for the above transition to be 1827.96 hours, or 76.16 days. We also demonstrate that the transition needs to be fully completed before the availability of ECDSA-256 breaking quantum devices, in order to ensure Bitcoin's ongoing security. The conclusion is that the Bitcoin upgrade to quantum-safe protocols needs to be started as soon as possible in order to guarantee its ongoing operations.

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Subjects
quant-phQuantum Physics cs.CRCryptography and Security cs.NINetworking and Internet Architecture

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