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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Human-Interpretable Adversarial Prompt Attack on Large Language Models with Situational Context · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2407.14644/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2407.14644/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Human-Interpretable Adversarial Prompt Attack on Large Language Models with Situational Context — mentioned by Terr_</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49100273</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:2407.14644:49100273</guid><pubDate>Wed, 29 Jul 2026 17:14:56 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; obvious to human(s) involved That probably depends on limiting how many bytes/characters/tokens the attacker can somehow influence. I don&amp;#x27;t mean just in terms of the context-window, but also in training-data, where they can stage a complex/clearer payload that will await a smaller/subtler trigger. In other words, imagine the evil creeping in through ten thousand subtle alterations of word-choice and formatting, rather than one clear demand. Humans won&amp;#x27;t notice, even if we had time/energy to review it all. ________ For a more-concrete example, I found this [0] where they&amp;#x27;ve taken a prompt…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2407.14644/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CL</category></item></channel></rss>
