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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Kurt Gödel and the Logic of Concepts · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2406.05442/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2406.05442/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Kurt Gödel and the Logic of Concepts — mentioned by EthanHeilman</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45088710</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:2406.05442:45088710</guid><pubDate>Mon, 01 Sep 2025 01:50:21 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; What Godel actually proved is that given a consistent formal system capable of representing arithmetic, there are statements in the language of that system such that neither the statement nor its negation can be proved in the system. It goes what step further, there are statements that are true but can not be proved. &amp;gt; Godel&amp;#x27;s theorems are notoriously liable to misinterpretation, and to be honest this sounds like one. What do you think was Godel&amp;#x27;s philosophical motivation for investigating incompleteness? &amp;quot;Many philosophers and logicians have explored the significance of these theorems.…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2406.05442/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>math.HO</category></item></channel></rss>
