Implications of computer science theory for the simulation hypothesis

Abstract

The simulation hypothesis has recently excited renewed interest in the physics and philosophy communities. However, the hypothesis specifically concerns {\textit{computers}} that simulate physical universes. So to formally investigate the hypothesis, we need to understand it in terms of computer science (CS) theory. In addition we need a formal way to couple CS theory with physics. Here I couple those fields by using the physical Church-Turing thesis. This allow me to exploit Kleene's second recursion, to prove that not only is it possible for {us} to be a simulation being run on a computer, but that we might be in a simulation being run a computer \emph{by us}. In such a ``self-simulation'', there would be two identical instances of us, both equally ``real''. I then use Rice's theorem to derive impossibility results concerning simulation and self-simulation; derive implications for (self-)simulation if we are being simulated in a program using fully homomorphic encryption; and briefly investigate the graphical structure of universes simulating other universes which contain computers running their own simulations. I end by describing some of the possible avenues for future research. While motivated in terms of the simulation hypothesis, the results in this paper are direct consequences of the Church-Turing thesis. So they apply far more broadly than the simulation hypothesis.