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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Can large language models democratize access to dual-use biotechnology? · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2306.03809/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2306.03809/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Can large language models democratize access to dual-use biotechnology? — mentioned by agucova</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41441351</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:2306.03809:41441351</guid><pubDate>Wed, 04 Sep 2024 02:38:00 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; What exactly does the evaluation entail? I believe the US AISI has published less on their specific approach, but they’re largely expected to follow the general approach implemented by the UK AISI [1] and METR [2]. This is mostly focused on evaluating models on potentially dangerous capabilities. Some major areas of work include: - Misuse risks: For example, determining whether models have (dual-use) expert-level knowledge in biology and chemistry, or the capacity to substantially facilitate large scale cyber attacks. A good example of this is the work by Soice et al on bioweapon uplift [5]…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2306.03809/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CY</category></item><item><title>Can large language models democratize access to dual-use biotechnology? — HN submission</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38600573</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:submission:2306.03809:38600573</guid><pubDate>Mon, 11 Dec 2023 13:45:09 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;Can large language models democratize access to dual-use biotechnology? [pdf]&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;1 point; 0 discussion replies on HN. &lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2306.03809/"&gt;Paper and source history&lt;/a&gt;. A submission is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CY</category></item><item><title>Can large language models democratize access to dual-use biotechnology? — mentioned by Herring</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37234123</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:2306.03809:37234123</guid><pubDate>Wed, 23 Aug 2023 11:05:12 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; In one hour, the chatbots suggested four potential pandemic pathogens, explained how they can be generated from synthetic DNA using reverse genetics, supplied the names of DNA synthesis companies unlikely to screen orders, identified detailed protocols and how to troubleshoot them, and recommended that anyone lacking the skills to perform reverse genetics engage a core facility or contract research organization. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2306.03809.pdf&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2306.03809/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CY</category></item></channel></rss>
