HackerPapers

arXiv:2112.10165cs.CR

What are Weak Links in the npm Supply Chain?

Nusrat Zahan, Thomas Zimmermann, Patrice Godefroid, Brendan Murphy, Chandra Maddila, Laurie Williams

Abstract

Modern software development frequently uses third-party packages, raising the concern of supply chain security attacks. Many attackers target popular package managers, like npm, and their users with supply chain attacks. In 2021 there was a 650% year-on-year growth in security attacks by exploiting Open Source Software's supply chain. Proactive approaches are needed to predict package vulnerability to high-risk supply chain attacks. The goal of this work is to help software developers and security specialists in measuring npm supply chain weak link signals to prevent future supply chain attacks by empirically studying npm package metadata. In this paper, we analyzed the metadata of 1.63 million JavaScript npm packages. We propose six signals of security weaknesses in a software supply chain, such as the presence of install scripts, maintainer accounts associated with an expired email domain, and inactive packages with inactive maintainers. One of our case studies identified 11 malicious packages from the install scripts signal. We also found 2,818 maintainer email addresses associated with expired domains, allowing an attacker to hijack 8,494 packages by taking over the npm accounts. We obtained feedback on our weak link signals through a survey responded to by 470 npm package developers. The majority of the developers supported three out of our six proposed weak link signals. The developers also indicated that they would want to be notified about weak links signals before using third-party packages. Additionally, we discussed eight new signals suggested by package developers.

arXiv comments
(e.g.: 10 pages, 1 figure)
Journal reference
DOI
doi:10.1145/3510457.3513044
Subjects
cs.CRCryptography and Security cs.CYComputers and Society cs.SESoftware Engineering

On Hacker News

Linked by 2 identifiable commenters in 2 comments across 2 threads, from Apr 2022 to Sep 2022. Found in 1 HN submission from Mar 2022 to Mar 2022. Open submission discussions.

Comments linking this paper, per year.

Discussed in comments2 threads

    • FWIIW I advocated for external review of security critical dependencies and hired external firms for this long before I started my own firm. The ROI is not having your company ended by someone malicious that reviewed that code before someone acting in your interest does. That…

      lrvickView on HNParent context

    • This is a fair question. The answer is that most malware behaves in ways that are deterministically detectable. For example, 93% of malware uses install scripts, which must be declared in the package.json file and are not possible to hide from our analysis. From recent research…

      ferossView on HNParent context

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