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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Beyond quadratic speedups in quantum attacks on symmetric schemes · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2110.02836/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2110.02836/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Beyond quadratic speedups in quantum attacks on symmetric schemes — mentioned by mswphd</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48387783</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:2110.02836:48387783</guid><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 18:27:00 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;It&amp;#x27;s worth noting that the above assumes that grover&amp;#x27;s is optimal for symmetric crypto. There are not that many quantum attacks against symmetric crypto that are better than grover&amp;#x27;s, so in some sense this is justified. But there are some attacks for particular constructions https://arxiv.org/pdf/2110.02836 So there is a risk that there are even more improved attacks that people aren&amp;#x27;t looking for due to the conventional wisdom that grover&amp;#x27;s is the best you can do for symmetric crypto. Hopefully this risk doesn&amp;#x27;t end up materializing.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2110.02836/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>quant-ph</category></item></channel></rss>
