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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Demonstration of Shor's factoring algorithm for N=21 on IBM quantum processors · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2103.13855/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2103.13855/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Demonstration of Shor's factoring algorithm for N=21 on IBM quantum processors — mentioned by patrakov</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45091023</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:2103.13855:45091023</guid><pubDate>Mon, 01 Sep 2025 09:24:12 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;The article, if examined by a non-specialist like me, seems to contain an answer to this concern at the end: &amp;gt; There are papers that claim to have factored 21 with a quantum computer. For example, here’s one from 2021 [1]. But, as far as I know, all such experiments are guilty of using optimizations that imply the code generating the circuit had access to information equivalent to knowing the factors. [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.13855&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2103.13855/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>quant-ph</category></item><item><title>Demonstration of Shor's factoring algorithm for N=21 on IBM quantum processors — mentioned by JanisErdmanis</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39799151</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:2103.13855:39799151</guid><pubDate>Sat, 23 Mar 2024 11:35:22 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;It is! Taking into account that only the Schor algorithm is proven to be exponentially faster in factorising numbers and looking into current progress on using it, the threat for RSA 2048 will become real in ridiculous 2^2048 years. This can be estimated by taking three events in factorisation: 2002: factorisation of 15 [1] 2012: factorisation of 21 [2] 2022: factorisation of 35 by IBM (although the article is about number 21, but let’s give them credit) [3] In a plot, the tendency is somewhat linear, with the factorised number increasing by one every year. A sceptic immediately replies to…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2103.13855/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>quant-ph</category></item><item><title>Demonstration of Shor's factoring algorithm for N=21 on IBM quantum processors — mentioned by JanisErdmanis</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39674287</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:2103.13855:39674287</guid><pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2024 23:15:06 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;The threat estimate for a quantum computer that breaks cryptography shall be based on currently available data and the understanding that only the Schor algorithm is known to provide exponential speedup for factorisation. Let’s give IBM credit for attempting to factor in the number 35 in 2022, although they failed there [1]. Before that, the successful factorisation happened for the number 21 in 2012 [2] and the first factorisation of 15 in 2001 [3]. Now we have three points. There is a trend that the factorised number grows by a number of 10 for every ten years. Thus, to get a quantum…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2103.13855/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>quant-ph</category></item></channel></rss>
