Adversarial collision attacks on image hashing functions — mentioned by xucheng

Sun, 08 Aug 2021 04:24:18 GMT

While it is good that Apple seeks formal security analysis over its proposed system, there are some fundamental security assumptions baked in the system: - It assumes that the server would not tamper its dataset (i,e., the list of CSAM). So it is OK to disclose the information if the client has enough matchings. But in reality, nothing prevents a malicious server adding arbitrary content to the list. - It fails to consider the vulnerabilities of the perceptual hash. This includes false positives and adversarial collision attacks (https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.09473). Another potential long term…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Adversarial collision attacks on image hashing functions · HackerPapers discussions

Adversarial collision attacks on image hashing functions — mentioned by xucheng