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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Hiding the Access Pattern is Not Enough: Exploiting Search Pattern Leakage in Searchable Encryption · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2010.03465/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2010.03465/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Hiding the Access Pattern is Not Enough: Exploiting Search Pattern Leakage in Searchable Encryption — mentioned by mahmoudimus</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31657299</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:2010.03465:31657299</guid><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jun 2022 17:08:48 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;You&amp;#x27;re on the right track. I work in the data security space and while this is a cool release, it&amp;#x27;s not novel[0] and has been around for a while[1]. As a general rule of thumb, the first thing to check is if the provider is asking you to pass in your query in plain text AND without a local client (very important, because if you&amp;#x27;re sending data in plaintext, the threat model is now transitioning to a honest-but-curious model). This is obviously not that. They&amp;#x27;re encrypting locally. However, Simon Oya &amp;amp; Dr. Kerschbaum&amp;#x27;s paper, https://arxiv.org/abs/2010.03465, demonstrate a fantastic efficient…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2010.03465/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item></channel></rss>
