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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>SEVurity: No Security Without Integrity -- Breaking Integrity-Free Memory Encryption with Minimal Assumptions · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2004.11071/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2004.11071/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>SEVurity: No Security Without Integrity -- Breaking Integrity-Free Memory Encryption with Minimal Assumptions — mentioned by ENOTTY</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23835313</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:2004.11071:23835313</guid><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2020 17:57:31 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;AMD SEV&amp;#x27;s mode has changed over time (as AMD moved from SEV, to SEV-ES, to SEV-SNP). Each time, some academic has managed to reverse engineer the mode. This paper (published 2020) has documented the developments and reverse engineered the mode in SEV-ES. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.11071.pdf&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2004.11071/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>SEVurity: No Security Without Integrity -- Breaking Integrity-Free Memory Encryption with Minimal Assumptions — mentioned by lima</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23471551</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:2004.11071:23471551</guid><pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2020 22:13:23 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;Yes - in a recent paper by Wilke et al[0], they nicely demonstrate how the lack of integrity checking can be exploited. SEV is a very new technology and its current (and previous) iterations have known weaknesses. The next generation of SEV will likely have SEV-SNP[1], which will prevent the host from writing guest memory/messing with the guest&amp;#x27;s page mappings. Will probably take a few more iterations to stabilize. At that point, it should provide decent security guarantees. Current-gen SGX has much stronger guarantees (conceptually, at least) with full memory integrity checking and less…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2004.11071/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>SEVurity: No Security Without Integrity -- Breaking Integrity-Free Memory Encryption with Minimal Assumptions — mentioned by ENOTTY</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23469377</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:2004.11071:23469377</guid><pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2020 18:39:07 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;SEV has been subjected to its own share of attacks (and design/implementation fails), but note that it has a different threat model. * https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.05090.pdf 2017 * https://arxiv.org/pdf/1612.01119.pdf 2017 * https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.09604.pdf 2018 * https://ipads.se.sjtu.edu.cn/_media/publications/fidelius_hp... 2018 * https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/Jun/46 2019 * https://www3.cs.stonybrook.edu/~mikepo/papers/severest.asiac... 2019 * https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec19-li-mengyuan_0.pdf 2019 * https://arxiv.org/pdf/1908.11680.pdf 2019 *…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/2004.11071/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item></channel></rss>
