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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Assessing the Privacy Benefits of Domain Name Encryption · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1911.00563/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1911.00563/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Assessing the Privacy Benefits of Domain Name Encryption — mentioned by np-tokumei</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27774360</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1911.00563:27774360</guid><pubDate>Thu, 08 Jul 2021 16:35:04 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;In the current designs, plaintext domain names are mainly exposed through two channels: the SNI extension in TLS, and traditional DNS name resolutions—the deployment of DoH/DoT is thus a prerequisite for ESNI. Equivalently, the use of DoH/DoT will not provide any meaningful privacy if domain names are still exposed through the (unencrypted) SNI extension in TLS handshake traffic. Recently, there is a push for the deployment of DoH/DoT, with major organizations already supporting it (e.g., Google, Cloudflare, Firefox), though this has not been followed by an equivalent effort for the…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1911.00563/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item></channel></rss>
