The ontological identity of empirical indiscernibles: Leibniz's methodological principle and its significance in the work of Einstein

Abstract

This article explores the following methodological principle for theory construction in physics: if an ontological theory predicts two scenarios that are ontologically distinct but empirically indiscernible, then this theory should be rejected and replaced by one relative to which the scenarios are ontologically the same. I defend the thesis that this methodological principle was first articulated by Leibniz as a version of his principle of the identity of indiscernibles, and that it was applied repeatedly to great effect by Einstein in his development of the special and general theories of relativity. I argue for an interpretation of the principle as an inference to the best explanation, defend it against some criticisms, discuss its potential applications in modern physics, and explain how it provides an attractive middle ground in the debate between empiricist and realist philosophies of science.