In this essay we'll prove Gödel's incompleteness theorems twice. First, we'll prove them the good old-fashioned way. Then we'll repeat the feat in the setting of computation. In the process we'll discover that Gödel's work, rightly viewed, needs to be split into two parts: the transport of computation into the arena of arithmetic on the one hand and the actual incompleteness theorems on the other. After we're done there will be cake.
arXiv comments
First published on https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ on December 30. 2018
Journal reference
Bulletin of the European Association for Theoretical Computer Science, No 128, June 2019
Linked by 3 identifiable commenters in 3 comments across 3 threads, from Dec 2019 to Jun 2025. Found in 2 HN submissions from Dec 2022 to Apr 2023. Open submission discussions.
Yeah, but the vexing part is "how can that be true for e.g. N=643 but not N=642"? What happens at whatever number it starts true at? Incidentally, Gödel's theorem eventually comes down to a halting-like argument as well (well, a diagonal argument). There is a presentation of it…
There's another paper called "Incompleteness Ex Machina" with several proofs of both the first and second incompleteness theorems. https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.04569
Yeah, but the vexing part is "how can that be true for e.g. N=643 but not N=642"? What happens at whatever number it starts true at? Incidentally, Gödel's theorem eventually comes down to a halting-like argument as well (well, a diagonal argument). There is a presentation of it…
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