Insecure Until Proven Updated: Analyzing AMD SEV's Remote Attestation · HackerPapers discussions

Insecure Until Proven Updated: Analyzing AMD SEV's Remote Attestation — mentioned by libroot

Fri, 10 Oct 2025 19:25:57 GMT

Sure, threat models matter, but that's exactly the point. TEEs are marketed as if they solve the "malicious infrastructure" problem. Cloud providers tell you they can't see your data, and vendors pitch TEEs as some kind of hardware-rooted guarantee. If your threat model is "malicious sysadmin" or "host operator" then the fact that the root of trust is opaque, unauditable, and repeatedly compromised does matter. Saying "what's your alternative" also misses the criticism. The issue isn't whether TEEs can reduce some threats compared to no isolation at all. Obviously they can in some scenarios.…

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Insecure Until Proven Updated: Analyzing AMD SEV's Remote Attestation — mentioned by Reelin

Fri, 07 Aug 2020 13:39:15 GMT

I feel the need to disclaim that I have no actual experience using SEV. Also it looks like the attestation protocol may have been broken by attacking the PSP firmware? I have no idea what the current state of affairs is, particularly regarding the claimed firmware downgrade vulnerability. https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.11680 https://berlin-crypto.github.io/event/amdsev.html

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Insecure Until Proven Updated: Analyzing AMD SEV's Remote Attestation — mentioned by zimmerfrei

Wed, 15 Jul 2020 10:19:35 GMT

This is using SEV-ES (SEV2) which is vulnerable to the severe attack described last year in [1], and unfixable due to the lack of antirollback functionality. Only SEV-SNP [2] is supposed to address it, but only on new silicon which doesn't exist yet, and that probably not even Google has. So why is Google releasing this feature if it is so flawed? [1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1908.11680.pdf [2] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthen...

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Insecure Until Proven Updated: Analyzing AMD SEV's Remote Attestation — mentioned by ENOTTY

Tue, 09 Jun 2020 18:39:07 GMT

SEV has been subjected to its own share of attacks (and design/implementation fails), but note that it has a different threat model. * https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.05090.pdf 2017 * https://arxiv.org/pdf/1612.01119.pdf 2017 * https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.09604.pdf 2018 * https://ipads.se.sjtu.edu.cn/_media/publications/fidelius_hp... 2018 * https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/Jun/46 2019 * https://www3.cs.stonybrook.edu/~mikepo/papers/severest.asiac... 2019 * https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec19-li-mengyuan_0.pdf 2019 * https://arxiv.org/pdf/1908.11680.pdf 2019 *…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.