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arXiv:1907.10279cs.CR

A Forensic Audit of the Tor Browser Bundle

Matt Muir, Petra Leimich, William J Buchanan

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Abstract

The increasing use of encrypted data within file storage and in network communications leaves investigators with many challenges. One of the most challenging is the Tor protocol, as its main focus is to protect the privacy of the user, in both its local footprint within a host and over a network connection. The Tor browser, though, can leave behind digital artefacts which can be used by an investigator. This paper outlines an experimental methodology and provides results for evidence trails which can be used within real-life investigations.

arXiv comments
Journal reference
Digital Investigation, Volume 29, June 2019, Pages 118-128
DOI
doi:10.1016/j.diin.2019.03.010
Subjects
cs.CRCryptography and Security

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