Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges · HackerPapers discussions

Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges — mentioned by lazzlazzlazz

Sat, 17 Sep 2022 01:29:55 GMT

This is a deeply misleading headline. Other people have explained it as well, but Flashbots is a relay for transmitting transactions to the Ethereum network in a way that preserves their privacy (and exposure to something called MEV[1]). It's purely optional and the vast majority of transactions[2] do not actually pass through this relay. MEV is an interesting area of research[3]. Unrelated aside: why is the quality of Hacker News posts and comments on crypto so bad? I experience extreme Gell-Mann amnesia[4] almost every post I read. This is the industry I work in and the amount of…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges — HN submission

Fri, 06 May 2022 16:14:47 GMT

Flash Boys 2: Frontrunning, transaction reordering, consensus instability (2019)

146 points; 48 discussion replies on HN. Paper and source history. A submission is not an endorsement.

Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges — mentioned by 3np

Tue, 23 Feb 2021 14:10:21 GMT

Same, I even bought some back in... 2014 I think? I'm yet ambivalent on if it's a factor on why it hasn't been able to attract serious attention, but I've heard the argument that doing calculations that have external value outside of PoW breaks the incentive mechanisms. To me, merge mining on Bitcoin[0] and MEV on Ethereum[1] are evidence against that argument, since we already have those forces in play today. So Gridcoins concept should work. [0]: https://blog.bitmex.com/the-growth-of-bitcoin-merge-mining/ [1]: https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.05234

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges — mentioned by bondarchuk

Sun, 07 Feb 2021 18:28:46 GMT

It gets even funnier when you consider that miners may reorder transactions they include in a block as they see fit, and even add their own transactions to front-run others. https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.05234

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges — mentioned by v64

Sat, 16 Jan 2021 22:29:48 GMT

Flash loans are a great example of how blockchains enable new types of financial transactions that either aren't possible or are very difficult to do in a traditional financial setting. If you identify an arbitrage opportunity in the market, you can atomically borrow a large sum of money to take advantage of the price difference. You also have the added assurance that if the arbitrage opportunity goes away before you can take advantage of it, the entire transaction fails and you only lose the Ethereum transaction fee. It's essentially risk-free arbitrage. This paper [1] dives into detail…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges — HN submission

Mon, 07 Sep 2020 05:38:46 GMT

Frontrunning, Tx Reordering and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges

1 point; 0 discussion replies on HN. Paper and source history. A submission is not an endorsement.

Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges — HN submission

Sat, 29 Aug 2020 23:29:31 GMT

Flash Boys 2.0

1 point; 0 discussion replies on HN. Paper and source history. A submission is not an endorsement.

Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges — mentioned by jkhdigital

Sun, 24 Nov 2019 05:20:10 GMT

So glad you asked: 1. https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/748.pdf 2. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1810.11605.pdf 3. https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/775.pdf 4. https://users.encs.concordia.ca/~clark/papers/2019_wtsc_fron... 5. http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/patrick.mccorry/minerbribery.p... This one isn't an attack per se, it is mostly an exploration of arbitrage bots in decentralized exchanges running on Ethereum smart contracts. However, they point out that miners can trivially capture the value of the arbitrage transactions by front-running, and that this "free money" is like a bonus block subsidy that falls…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges — mentioned by momentmaker

Mon, 15 Apr 2019 21:31:45 GMT

Coincidentally, there is a paper and talk about this called: Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.05234v1 https://www.cbspringconference.org/

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.