HackerPapers

arXiv:1902.07792cs.ET

SMART: Secure Magnetoelectric AntifeRromagnet-Based Tamper-Proof Non-Volatile Memory

Nikhil Rangarajan, Satwik Patnaik, Johann Knechtel, Ozgur Sinanoglu, Shaloo Rakheja

HN submission. Found in a submission link or body. Submitters do not count as commenters in the main ranking; a submission is not an endorsement.

Abstract

The storage industry is moving toward emerging non-volatile memories (NVMs), including the spin-transfer torque magnetoresistive random-access memory (STT-MRAM) and the phase-change memory (PCM), owing to their high density and low-power operation. In this paper, we demonstrate, for the first time, circuit models and performance benchmarking for the domain wall (DW) reversal-based magnetoelectric-antiferromagnetic random access memory (ME-AFMRAM) at cell-level and at array-level. We also provide perspectives for coherent rotation-based memory switching with topological insulator-driven anomalous Hall read-out. In the coherent rotation regime, the ultra-low power magnetoelectric switching coupled with the terahertz-range antiferromagnetic dynamics result in substantially lower energy-per-bit and latency metrics for the ME-AFMRAM compared to other NVMs including STTMRAM and PCM. After characterizing the novel ME-AFMRAM, we leverage its unique properties to build a dense, on-chip, secure NVM platform, called SMART: A Secure Magnetoelectric Antiferromagnet- Based Tamper-Proof Non-Volatile Memory. New NVM technologies open up challenges and opportunities from a data-security perspective. For example, their sensitivity to magnetic fields and temperature fluctuations, and their data remanence after power-down make NVMs vulnerable to data theft and tampering attacks. The proposed SMART memory is not only resilient against data confidentiality attacks seeking to leak sensitive information but also ensures data integrity and prevents Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks on the memory. It is impervious to particular power side-channel (PSC) attacks which exploit asymmetric read/write signatures for 0 and 1 logic levels, and photonic side-channel attacks which monitor photo-emission signatures from the chip backside.

arXiv comments
in IEEE Access, 2020
Journal reference
DOI
doi:10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2988889
Subjects
cs.ETEmerging Technologies cs.CRCryptography and Security

On Hacker News

No comments linking this paper were found in the collected sources. Found in 1 HN submission from Feb 2019 to Feb 2019. Open submission discussions.

Comments linking this paper, per year.

Discussed in comments0 threads

No comments linking this paper were found in the collected sources. Open submission discussions.

Submitted to Hacker News

Connected through shared HN threads, not inferred similarity or a recommendation.