Practical Enclave Malware with Intel SGX · HackerPapers discussions

Practical Enclave Malware with Intel SGX — mentioned by Reelin

Fri, 06 Mar 2020 05:20:16 GMT

That's... slightly better? I think? Honestly SGX is complicated enough that I'm not entirely sure I have this straight. Am I correct in thinking that: 1. A user-programmable MSR would allow the device owner to falsify the attestation of enclave initialization (when using their own keys). 2. The ME (and other firmware) would still not be replaceable or owner controllable. 3. Due to 2, enclave compromise would have to be premeditated. That is, once an enclave is up and running IIUC it can (potentially) use MRENCLAVE to derive the sealing key. Without control of the ME that enclave would be…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Practical Enclave Malware with Intel SGX — HN submission

Fri, 30 Aug 2019 18:49:57 GMT

Practical Enclave Malware with Intel SGX

7 points; 0 discussion replies on HN. Paper and source history. A submission is not an endorsement.

Practical Enclave Malware with Intel SGX — HN submission

Tue, 12 Feb 2019 20:58:19 GMT

Practical Enclave Malware with Intel SGX

2 points; 0 discussion replies on HN. Paper and source history. A submission is not an endorsement.