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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>True2F: Backdoor-resistant authentication tokens · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1810.04660/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1810.04660/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>True2F: Backdoor-resistant authentication tokens — mentioned by kwantam</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19955207</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1810.04660:19955207</guid><pubDate>Sun, 19 May 2019 20:08:44 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;It&amp;#x27;s possible to rule out some (but not necessarily all) cross-protocol attacks with a simple and cheap tweak. I have not proved that this rules out everything, but it appears to be no weaker than the scheme sans tweak, and proofs shouldn&amp;#x27;t be too hard. The high-level idea is to derive a new encryption key from the recipient&amp;#x27;s signing key, such that only the recipient knows the secret. This is similar to HD wallets[1] and some recent work by Dauterman et al.[2]. It&amp;#x27;s easy to show, following the work of Morita et al.[3], that EdDSA is secure against (certain) related-key attacks. This means…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1810.04660/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item></channel></rss>
