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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1806.10360/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1806.10360/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication — mentioned by red0point</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30763468</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1806.10360:30763468</guid><pubDate>Tue, 22 Mar 2022 07:19:35 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;They still do, since in 5G you can capture a SUCI, replace it on a later connection attempt, and observe if the phone can still attach. See [1], section 5.2.3, and it‘s implemented in [2]. Finally, localization attacks could potentially still work as well. [1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.10360.pdf [2] https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3448300.3467826&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1806.10360/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item></channel></rss>
