<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>TARANET: Traffic-Analysis Resistant Anonymity at the NETwork layer · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1802.08415/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1802.08415/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>TARANET: Traffic-Analysis Resistant Anonymity at the NETwork layer — mentioned by sparkie</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44525072</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1802.08415:44525072</guid><pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2025 20:17:57 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;LN is an onion routed network, and has some privacy - notably, sender privacy, as the sender does not need to be known to the recipient. The recipient however is not private, but there have been proposals for rendevouz routing which could also anonymize them. LN payments are based on Sphinx[1], but they don&amp;#x27;t leverage the full capabilities of it. Sphinx only allows for single-use replies. The proposals for bidirectional anonymity involve using HORNET[2], which builds on Sphinx (specifically, it uses Sphinx&amp;#x27;s single-reply message to establish a HORNET connection), and enables sender-receiver…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1802.08415/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item></channel></rss>
