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arXiv:1711.06030cs.GT

Sub-committee Approval Voting and Generalised Justified Representation Axioms

Haris Aziz, Barton E. Lee

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Abstract

Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting (SCV) that simultaneously generalizes these settings. We then focus on sub-committee voting with approvals and propose extensions of the justified representation axioms that have been considered for proportional representation in approval-based committee voting. We study the properties and relations of these axioms. For each of the axioms, we analyse whether a representative committee exists and also examine the complexity of computing and verifying such a committee.

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cs.GTComputer Science and Game Theory cs.AIArtificial Intelligence

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  1. Distributed consensus revised 1 comment

    • It'd almost certainly seem interesting to see whether one might manage to crosspollinate the above paper with this 'recent' generalization result from parameterized computational social choice theory: https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.06030 (Published version, closed access…

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