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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1710.09437/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1710.09437/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget — mentioned by DennisP</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32431787</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1710.09437:32431787</guid><pubDate>Thu, 11 Aug 2022 21:14:36 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;If you really want to dig in, here are the key papers on the PoS algorithm: https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.09437 https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.03052 To learn about the sharding plan and various other stuff in the roadmap, this is a great technical overview: https://members.delphidigital.io/reports/the-hitchhikers-gui...&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1710.09437/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget — mentioned by nmwnmw</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31016482</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1710.09437:31016482</guid><pubDate>Wed, 13 Apr 2022 16:14:36 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;This is the same Virgil of: - Ethereum Proof of Stake [1] - King of the Nerds TV Show - Wikiscanner [2] Source [3] [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.09437 [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WikiScanner [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virgil_Griffith&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1710.09437/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget — mentioned by DennisP</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26960706</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1710.09437:26960706</guid><pubDate>Tue, 27 Apr 2021 19:56:58 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; if over 1/3 of the staked coins are malicious So now you&amp;#x27;ve escalated the attack to be a 33% staker, which I don&amp;#x27;t think you&amp;#x27;d mentioned before. I&amp;#x27;ll note that 33% of stake is likely to cost more than 50% of mining hardware, and certainly would at the high levels of staking you&amp;#x27;re concerned about. &amp;gt; The system doesn&amp;#x27;t know how many distinct validators exist Each validator has 32 ETH. If you want to stake more, then you run more validators. The system does continue running with a split chain, each side apply the leak to the other side. Seems to me if the network reconnects, the side with the…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1710.09437/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget — mentioned by DennisP</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26317217</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1710.09437:26317217</guid><pubDate>Tue, 02 Mar 2021 16:45:17 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;Here are the two papers on Casper: Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget: https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.09437 Combining GHOST and Casper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.03052 A very simple summary is that it&amp;#x27;s a fairly traditional consensus protocol, in which if anyone breaks the rules it&amp;#x27;s possible to prove who did it and penalize them by burning their stake. It achieves scale by using aggregated signatures.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1710.09437/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget — mentioned by DennisP</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26191962</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1710.09437:26191962</guid><pubDate>Fri, 19 Feb 2021 11:28:27 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;Shard execution isn&amp;#x27;t necessary for migrating to proof-of-stake. The PoS migration just links a single EVM to the beacon chain; that&amp;#x27;s enough to remove PoW, i.e. the main concern in this discussion about GPUs. Around the same time is the migration to data sharding, which multiplies data storage by 23X initially. That&amp;#x27;s without code execution on the shards. Zkrollups in production now do the execution off-chain. On chain, you store compressed state data and a compact proof that everything executed correctly. That&amp;#x27;s good for a couple thousand tx/sec today, and 23X that after data sharding.…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1710.09437/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget — mentioned by DennisP</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18815853</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1710.09437:18815853</guid><pubDate>Thu, 03 Jan 2019 15:37:19 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;I&amp;#x27;m not up to date but here&amp;#x27;s the Casper FFG paper, which says: &amp;gt; Accountable safety means that two conflicting checkpoints cannot both be finalized unless ≥1/3 of validators violate a slashing condition (meaning at least one third of the total deposit is lost). Plausible liveness means that, regardless of any previous events (e.g., slashing events, delayed blocks, censorship attacks, etc.), if ≥2/3 of validators follow the protocol, then it’s always possible to finalize a new checkpoint without any validator violating a slashing condition. https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.09437 So if more than a…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1710.09437/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget — mentioned by DennisP</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17140017</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1710.09437:17140017</guid><pubDate>Thu, 24 May 2018 01:00:16 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;Interesting points. A defense against this type of attack is to use at least the hybrid proof-of-stake design that Ethereum is rolling out in about three months; blocks are proposed by proof of work, but proof of stake periodically adds a layer of &amp;quot;economic finality.&amp;quot; Here&amp;#x27;s a paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.09437&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1710.09437/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget — HN submission</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15602929</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:submission:1710.09437:15602929</guid><pubDate>Wed, 01 Nov 2017 16:33:49 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;2 points; 0 discussion replies on HN. &lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1710.09437/"&gt;Paper and source history&lt;/a&gt;. A submission is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item></channel></rss>
